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116 Adroaldo Moura DaSilyà
VI FINAL COMMENTS
Here is the prin ipa message at this study. The minidevaluation Pulicy
adopted by Brazil is essentially the application of thepurchasing Power
parity theory, which, in turn, was nspred by the teachingsof the quaritita.
tive theory of money. It upholds the spirit ofa system of fixed exchange
rates, except for the fatthatitneutralizes the unfavorable impactof
domestic: inflation on the balance ofcurrent transactions. Hence, there isa twofold role that exchange policycan play: (1) neutralizing the harmful
effects of domestic inflationon the trade balance due to the changes inrela-
tive prices of domestic goods,on the one hand, and of international goods,on
the other, provided the terms oftrade remain constant; and(2) avoiding the
disequilibrium in the trade balancegenerated by changes in theterms of trade, which results in inflationarypressures in the case of gain,or in
deflationary pressureson production and employment inthe case of
deterioration in the terms of trade.
Although they are obvious, itis worthwhile to emphasizethese basic
factors underlying the Braziliansystem of minidevaluation, especiallyat a
particularly difficult moment like thepresent one in Brazil. Finally, itmust be pointed out thatwe have deliberately omittedsome of the other aspects
of the problem, especially inregard to the capitalaccount. Here the policy
of minidevalijationcan he understood as an incentiveto attract financial
resources: if the policy is carried outso that devaluation occurs through the
difference between domestic andforeign inflation, the indexationrate on
the cruzeiro counterpart of theexternal debt is necessarilysmaller than that
applicable to domestic values.Thus, since the capital marketabroad does



















ROBERTO B. M. MACEDO
Universidade de Sio Paulo
ACritical Review of the Relation
betweenthe Post-i 964 Wage Policy
and theWorsening of Brazil's
Size IncomeDistribution
in the Sixties
Since 1964 the Brazilian governmenthas pursued a wage policy that has
attracted considerable attention inthe literature. In particular, it hasbeen
credited with the worsening of Brazil's size orpersonal income distribution
in the sixties by, among others,Fishlow (1972), Hoffman and Duarte
(1972), and Baer and Beckerman (1974).It is the purpose of this paper to
discuss some of the aspects of thatpolicy and its relationship tothis
deterioration.
In reviewing some of the existingstudies, we found that, bothfrom the
conceptual and empirical points of view, thepost-i964 wage policy and its
role in shaping the Brazilian size incomedistribution in the sixtiesrequire
further examination. After taking intoconsideration several of its aspects
not heretofore discussed in the literature webecame convinced thatthe
wage policy has not beenneutral in its distributive impactand that this
impact is of a much more complex naturethan that implied bythe
analyses reviewed. It will be shown thatparticular groups of wage earners
have been clearly affected by the wagepolicy. However, on thebasis of
NOTE:Part ot the material in this paperas preser:ed in a paperwritten with PedroCipollari and
rmsented at the IPE-NBER Seminar on Indenation, Fb 26-28, t975,
in São Paulo. Theuflior wishes to
thank Pedro cipollari, Adroaldo da Silva,Roberto FendtIr.. and Miguel Brodafor conimeets and
SugRestiore,
117Roberto 13 MM
the existing evidence oneclnhiot conclude that the IlOflfleutrd(ity
01
wage policy hashenri iespons! bIn tor the ()l)Lervn(l changeinti0On1
income distributionby size in thesixties.I heI ink I)et%ri
the tOQ
phenomena is tar more coriipiicated than we have henri led to l)eIicp
th1
far. Moreover, the effectsof several other factors make it verydiffic0j
isolate the impact ot the wage policy a rid ('V(1 U1 t(its rd tt i \'ei 1tiport,1ri
For the purposes of this analysis we divide the l3raiiliari wage policy into
three areas: (1) minimum wages; (2) collective wage read justrnens emer
ing from the legally constrained bargaining process l)Ct\V'n ernpfover.
and labor unions; and (3) wages and salaries more directly under govrp
ment controlthose of public servants and workers in pul)lic enterprises
public utilities, and/or firms subsidized by the government. Sections i
IL
and Ill of this paper discuss each of these three areas senarately Section
presents sonic concluding remarks.
[I] THE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO MINIMUM WAGES
The series on real niininiuuil wages after1964isprobably the n1os
publicized data set related to the l3razi ian economy and willriott
repeated here. Whatever price index is use(l, the existing data showthat
real minimum wages present a declining trend after 1964; this isacceptei
as an unquestionable point)
Minimum Wages, Wages, and the Income Distribution
From this fact, however, several authors have concluded that realwages in
general have decreased and that this isone of the reasons for the worsen
ing of the income distribution in the sixties.2 Thisargunient S not offered ir
a theoretical model linking changes in minimumwages to changes in
wages and to changes in the income distribution;apparenty, the rationa'e
behinditisthat therestraint on niinimurn wages inthe sixties ha
constrained the income of people intile lower brackets ot the income
distribution, therefore increasrngthe degree ot inequality in the latter. \
closer look at the problem, howevershows that this conclusion cannot
taken for granted.
Our first point draws itsconceptual basis from a certain dualism encoun-
tered in the Brazilian labormarkets: the coexistence of formal arid inforrna
employment relationships Theformal marketis,in broad lines, charac-
terized by relationships ofemploynient that are relatively stable, reguiati
by law, and thatpay relatively higher wages. The informal labor marketi
characterized by unstableand low-incomeOccupations and includes
IBrazil's Wage_Policy 119
among othergroups, urban and rural workers without regular jobs, the
poorself.eniPlOYed, and doiiiestiLecvdiits. The releretice to these con-
cepts is necessaryhere because mininlum wages in Brazil actually hold
only for wage earnersin the formal market. Even in the cases theoretically
covered by theminimum wage laws there is the phenomenon of non-
compliance, known to occurespecially in the rural sector as well as in the
urban areas ofthe more backward regions. Since we will be focusing on
the size incomedistribution, it is also worth mentioning that in the group of
those receiving incomefrom sources other than wages there are many
whose money income is notnecessarily equal to or above tile minimum
wage. (This isthe case, for instance, with some groups of farmers and
rentiers.) The implicationis that the legal nhinimurn wage is not necessarily
the same as theminimum monetary income, and that there is a large
difference de facto between the measuresof these two concepts. A recent
survey of Brazilianhouseholds, covering 26 million people with monetary
income, showed that 28 percenthad a monthly monetary inconle below
half of the lega minimum wage andthat 52 percent recerved up to the
legal minimum!
ihus, it is evident that thosedirectly affected by the minimum wage
levels are not those at the very bottom ofthe income distribution. Even if
we assume thattile minimum wage could be useful as an instrumentfor
income redistribution, a large groupof low-income recipients would be
outside its direct coverage.
One could argue that the restraint on minimum wageshas caused losses
to those around the middle and benefitedthose at the top of the income
distribution, so that the overall impact of the minimum wagepolicy has
remained regressive. This argument, however, ignoresthe nossibility that
higher minimum wage levels could havecaused adverse employment
effects for those at the bottom of the income distribution.Higher minimum
wages, being a constraint on the wagesestablished for formal relationships
of employment. could have benefited those able tofind jobs at these wages
and caused losses to those left unemployed or forced to acceptlower-paid
occupations outside the formal market. Therefore,it can be seen that no
analysis of the distributive impact of the minimum wagepolicy can he
made without paying attention to the relative impactof the policy on
employment in the formal and informal labor markets.This has not yet
been done in Brazil; here we do not intend to gobeyond the conclusion
that one cannot trace the observed changes in theoverall income distribu-
tion to a set of figures on real minimum wages. Ill any case,we want to
pursue this still further.
A second point that can be raisedisthat, while thelevel of real
minimum wages has decreased since 1964, theproportion of workers
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decreased. Most of the annualdata on urban wages in Brazilconic
the forms submitted byfirms each April tO coriiply with the requirem1
the ''Law of Two-Thirds."This law requires firms to prove that
at least
two-thirds of the workers on theirpayroll are Brazilian Citizens,
and th
forms list name, citizenship,and monthly wages of each employee,
among
other things. Bacha et al. (1972)utilized the published data from
the;e
forms to determine trends in the proportionof workers receivingminimum
wages by means ofrelating the distribution classes to minimum'age
figures. Their conclusion, on thebasis of data for the states of
Guianabara
São Paulo, as well as the country as awhole, for the period]9651969
was that this proportionshowed a declining trend in that period.
For the state of São Paulo there is evidence that even in the agricLijtu1f
sector the minimum wage has been losing importance. Table 1presents a
comparison between the average monthly wage paid to a typical ruraf
worker, working on a per diem basis, and the minimum wage in theCjt,0f
São Paulo, for the period 1960-1974. It can he seen that the ratio of 1he.
two series shows a rising trend over tinie and that in 1973 the minimum
wage was surpassed in the agricultural sector of the state.
The results shown by Bacha et al. (1972) and on Table 1 reflect StruCttà
changes experienced by the Brazilian economy in the last decade. As the
result of the expansion of industry and services, the relative size of th
"labor surplus" available for the simplest occupations in the urbanareas
has been reduced. The fact that the riininiuiii wage has been losrn
importance is due both to the decline in its real value over time and to the
diminished importance of institutional wages in a tightening labor market.ft
is true that this process has been concentrated in the state of São Paulo and
in the southern part of the country. In other regions, however, the phenorn-
enon of noncompliance casts doubt upon the relevance of ihe lega'
minimum as an actual lower bound to wages.
A third point examines the meaning of the loss implied by the fall in the
real value of minimum wages in the sixties. Agroup of workers would hae
lost real income in this case if they had continuously receivedminimum
wages for a period up to a whole decade. This would mean that they were
not able to improve their position in the earnings scale above the levefo'
minimum wages. But this is not theway labor markets operate. We hae
evidence showing that internal labormarkets are important inBrazi
workers go up on occupational ladderswhich increase s'ages with th
length of service in the firm,with a large part of the skills 01 the Braziiia
labor force obtained throughon-the-job iraining.Itis difficult to beliee
that in the formalsector covered by the minimum wage l,isthe pcope
receiving minimumwages in 11)70 are the same as those who receisec
minimum wages in1960. Moreover, there isno guarantee that thoce







































TABLE iState of São Paulo: Comparison between Monthly Wage
Received by a Typical Rural Worker and
Minimum Wage in the City of São Paulo, 1960-1974
(annual averages)
SOURCES: 1instiwlo de Econonia Agricola do Estado de SãoPaulo, PognOsiico 75/76. São Paulo:
1975, p. 43.
2. Cor,junwra Econômica 29 (January 1975).
minimum wages were higher. Therefore,the loss caused by the drop in the
real value of the minimum wage cannotbe unambiguously determined
except under particular conditions.
Following this line of reasoning, we haveidentified a group of people
who have suffered such losses: thosewho receive transfers, especially
pensions and retirement allowances,from the Brazilian federal social
security system. These transfers have beentied to minimum wages or to the
indexes discussed in the next sectionof this paper. In both cases, the
resulting indexation lagged behind cost ofliving figures in major parts of
the period after 1964. Being outside the labormarket, the pensioners and
retired people have been affected by the wagepolicy since they do not
have the same chances, open to those in the laborforce, of improving their
wages in the occupational laddersof the market.
Minimum Wages and Indexation
One could ask why, after all, the governmenthas pursued a policyof
restricted minimum wages. On the one hand, it seemsthat in pursuing an





























1966 53.61 81.00 0.66
1967 74.76 101.50 0.74
1968 98.61 124.07 0.79
1969 116.25 147.20 0.79
1970 154.05 174.27 0.88
1971 193.35 212.80 0.91
1972 257.40 254.40 0.99
1973 340.50 297.93 1.14
1974 475.50 355.20 1.34L
$
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iiiuiii wagescould have nfl mipact on intlatI()il, either by
a CO5t.p
mechanism and/or b' its effects onthe exl)c(tatlons withregaril
future rate of inflation. On theother hand, the illiflimuni
Wage levels ha
increasingly been used as a nle(hanism of i ndexation, either defineci
b,
laws or informally established, Covering a wide gwup of items from
and mortgage payments to traffic fines.
This shows that in addition to wages and transters froni the
governm
there are other sources of income affected by minimum Wage levels
that the impact of the minimum wage policy C1fl be analyzed also 1om
th
expenditure side, given the fact that some prices in the economy have
indexed to minimum wages. On the whole, the lesson is that ananaIsjc1
the distributive impact of the niinimuni wage Policy cannot be
limited to
minimum wage earners as such.
Early in 1975 the use of minimum wages as a basis for indexation
carre
to an end. Until then they had been the basis for i ndexatjon most ijkI',
to
be affected by government guidelines, since the governnlentuses its os,n
discretion in determining their levels.6 This discussion of niinirnu
Wages
as an indexation mechanism points to the fact the Brazilian
indexaj0q
system is not left to operate to its fullest extent, being at least
oarfla
reflection of government guideposts. On thes'hole, the minimum wakes
are equivalent to a series of underestimated price indexes; in the end
they
came to be viewed by Brazilian policymakers more as indexes than
as
wages.
liii THE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO COLLECTIVE
WAGE READJUST.
MENTS
Some Basics on the Policy
We may begin by defining thesope of this branch of Brazil's wage po1
As it stands now, iicovers the urban workers under the system of th
Consolidation of the Labor Laws(CL). This means that it affects svorkeNir
the forriial urbansector except publft servants (the latterare subject to
different regulations). It alsocovers the workers in public enterprises, th
is,the public sectororganized as corporations. Thecoverage of the
program was broadened in thecourse of time. In the beginning it com-
prised solely workersin public enterprises and/or public utilities andor
firms subsidized bythe government. Policycriteria were constantly e-
tended until theyreached all urban workers underthe CLL.
Turning to theway the policy olwrates, it should be notedat the outt
that in Brazil thereare no collective laborcontra( ts, that is, contractsBrazilS Wagepolicy 123
hich a firmdeals with clabor union to negotiate labor services to be
0idcd by a groupof tlfliOfl members. Nevertheless once an indi'idijal is
rnployed he isplaced, under a set of public regulations, within the
jurisdicti0fl of aparticular labor union which represents the workers as a
group. The majorissues dealt with by the labor unions are collective wage
readjustnllefltsprimarily designedto compensate workers for inflation.
On the employerside, the firms are similarly placed by public regulation
under the jurisdictionof an association of firms that represents them as a
group. Thus,the bargaining process takes place between labor unions and
associations of firms. Prior to1964, the readjustment rates were negotiated
free of governmentlimitations. The high rates of inflation and the political
agitation that followedthe resignatiOn of President Janio Quadros in 1961
made the negotiationsincreasingly difficult, and strikes by the major
e unions became commonplacein the period 1961-1963. These strikes were
o certainly one of the ingredients ol the Politicalfermentation that led to the
n mihtary takeover of 1964.
The new government took steps in thedirection of avoiding the socIal
n and political turmoil involved in wagereadjustment negotiations. Except for
a a very insignificantnumber of cases, strikes were forbidden and collective
wage readjustments in the areacovered by the policy became bound by
V monthly indexes published by the government. Theseindexes refer to
Iannual rates to be observed in each month's readjustment. For instance,
bank clerks have their readjustment inSeptember; if the index for Sep-
tember is 130, they are entitled to areadjustment of 30 per cent. In the
period 1962-1963 the strongest unions wereable to obtain read justments
on a six-month basis, hut since1964 readjustments for a period shorter
than one year have been rLIled out.
T. The system operates as follows. The National Wage Departmentinforms
the labor courts of the rate of wage readjustment to heobserved in court
cases. In case of disagreement betweenworkers and firms as to the rate,
the case goes to the courts, which cannot grant increasesabove the level
y. established by the National Wage Department. Since, as arule, the labor
he unions ask for rates of readjustment higher than theofficial rates, the case
I goes to the courts, which decide by followingthe rate established by the
to I government.
The rates established by the government areconiputed by a formula the
he I details of which can he found elsewhere.8 \iVhen it wasfirst established, the
1- basic elements of the formula were; (1) an indexation mechanismdesigned
tor I to restore the real wage of the workers to its averagevalue, on the basis of
cx- the last 24 months prior to the month of readjustment; (2)half of the rate of
inflation expected in the following one-year period; and 3)the annual rate
set of increase in the national average productivity iJer worker.
in I Two major changes have occurred in theformula sinceit was first124 Roberto B. M.MaC(J0
introduced. Unti1968 the expected rates of inflationesti mated
government..e., the second ek'rnent of the formula, Were
U lireajistic'nd consistently below the rates of inflationthat actuallyOccurredSuch underestimation brought complaints from the laborurloris and in 1q68
an attempt was made to correct it by rlleans of a modification in
the forniuja
Puttingitin rather simple terms, the new Iorrnul,i then
adopted
provided with an automatic mechanism for correcting
an underestimatio
of the expected rate of inflation in the precedingreadjustment Thuswhen establishing the new rate of readjustnient, rather thanConsidering'sages actually paid during the period in which the latestrea(ljustn-1 was in effect, the negotiations considered those wages thatWould have beenpaid if the expected rate of inflation used in thecalculations hadPrecisely coincided with the subsequent actual rate ofinflation.
The second major change occurred in JanuaryI 975, when the
base period for restoring the real value of theaverage wage was reducedfrom 24 to 12 months. This was done because, aftera Period of diminishing
inflation, its tempo accelerated again in1973 and, basedon an average of
24 months, the rates of readjustment lagged farbehind the increasing
rate of inflation.
In addition to these changes in the formulaas such, its application
has been subject to governmentinterference of various othersorts. The cost of living index thatserves as a basis for the indexation
niechanisni of the formula is an average of regionalgovernment indexes that arethemselves affected bygovernment interference. Furthermore, thedifficulties involved in computing the rate ofincrease in average nationalproductivity another element of the formula, havemade this rate subjectto ad-hoc estimation,
In view of all the problemssurrounding the formula and thecomputation of its components, it isnot surprising that the resultingreadjustment rates have received strongcriticism.Ithas concentratedon the question of whether or not thegovernment's rates have been closeto actual changes in the cost of living plusgains in productivity, Hereare the major points:9 (1) There is noconvincing justification foradopting the formulaas such; on the whole, it isa complicated mechanism forsubjecting collective read- justments togovernment guidelines Theadoption of a 24-month periodas a basis for thereconstruction of the realwage at the time the policy began to be applied isconsidered a device designedto result in low rates of
readjustment (2) Asa result of the 24-month ruleand the underestimation of the expectedrate of inflation, therates of readjustmentwere persistently below cost of livingfigures until 1968.(3) From 1968 on, the rates have matched cost of livingfigures more closelybut have not incorporated gains in Productivity,
As noted above,in early 1975 theformula undeventa major change As a result, therates of readjustmn












above thoseof the cost of living figures. For the whole 1964-1974
period; however, thegovernment indexes seem to indicate that the ratio-
nale behind thepolicy was one of restraint on the rates of readjustment
authorized by the government.
The Meaning ofthe Restraint Imposed by the Wage Policy
The perfunctorYattention we paid the analysis of the government's formu-
las and indexes wasintentional. We are convinced, for reasons to be
explained below, that one cannot judge the impact of the policy by simply
looking at these formulasand indexes. It will be shown that they do not
necessarily impose a bindingconstraint on either actual rates of readjust-
ment or the absolutelevel of wages observed in the market.
In fact, the wagereadjustment rates calculated pursuant to the formula
cannot be considered as an upper orlower limit that cannot be exceeded.
On the one hand, in spiteof the fact that collective wage readjustments are
subject to the policy, the firms and workers arefree to negotiate wage
readjustments above those established bythe formula, on an individual
basis. The firm can also extend this practice toall its workers if it feels that
it is necessary to do so. In such a casethe only risk is that firms subject to
the guidelines of the Price ControlBoard (generally large firms in the
manufacturing sector) will not receive approval for price increasesderiving
from collective wage readjustments granted above ratesdetermined by the
wage policy. In theory, they willhave to absorb the difference by means of
improvements in labor productivity. In practice,the Price Control Board
follows ad-hoc procedures, the effectivenessof which, in terms of price
and wage controls, remains to bedetermined.
On the other hand, the wage policy does not prevent afirm from firing
workers ifit finds the new wage level resultingfrom the wage policy
mechanism to be above the value of the workers tothe firm, nor does it
prevent workers from leaving the firm if theyconsider their wages below
what they could be earning elsewhere.
Therefore, the wage policy can be viewed, inpractice, as determining
the minimum rate of wage increases for permanentemployees. Under
these conditions it becomes evident that thealready-mentioned policy
of setting yearly rates of increase below the rate ofinflation, or below the
rate of inflation plus productivity, is particularlydetrimental for employees
linked to their jobs by stable employment relationships sothat the mini-
mum rate of increase determined by the wagepolicy becomes the only
readjustment they obtain.
The question arises whether sizable groups ofworkers find themselves in
this situation. In the next section, it will be shown that some
groups can be




the whole, however,it should he pointed out that,1(tual ra teut readjustment are not necc'ssari ly those esthIislied by the
l)Oli
Firct, labor turnover in Brazililarge enough to0e 'IIharrierbetsse0 official and actual rates 01 readj ustment. The data Ol)tdined
through th 'Law of Two-Thirds'' revealed, br instance, that36 per( cutot thOSC employed in the ma riutacluring sector of the state01 Siu Paulofl197Q had less than one year of service inthe uirrn, and60percent had lessthan two years. 10Ingeneral,the collective\\'age
"agreements'' state that employees with less thanone year in the firni
ill have a readjustment on the basis of the officialrair' but
Propoional to their length of service in the firm. In any case, thewage negotiaeby the individual when entering the firm (the basis for this
readjustn),11) isfreeI negotiated between the worker and the firm at thattime andcan lie abose or below the wage received in the previous eniployment
Givc'n the hih
rates of turnover, after a few years it becomes difficultto ee to what
extent the individual's wage has been altected bythe wage policyand to svhat extent by the new wages negotiated whenmoving from firmto firm A second point is the existence,mentioned above, Ofinternal labo' markets inBrazil. This means that theindividual worker hasaccess to higher wages by means ofiniproving his positionon the occupational
ladder of his firm. Once there isa group of stable efllployeesin the firm they will receive at least themini mu iii readjustnient established byth wage policy. Therefore, to establish andnliainta in a wagestructure of the type usually encountered in theinternal riiarkets, the firmwill have togrant from time to timewage readjustments above those ofthe official indexesto at least a part of its labor force.
Thus, turnover and stabilityare important elements in theanalysis of the wage policy, since they make actualreadjustnients not necessarilyequal to those dictated by the officialrates. Turnover implies thatthe former can above or below the latter,while stability, withina hierarchical wage struc- ture, implies the possibilityof wage readjustrnentsabove the official ratm In sum, ourcontention as in thecase of nlininluni wages, is thatthe effectiveness of the policy,designed to imposeguidelines, is limited by the operation of labor marketmechanisms We have shownthat the actuj; rates of readjustmentcan be above or below theindexes established by the government so that theimpact of the wage policyon real wages become an empirical question.We thus Proceedto discuss the evidence forre wages in the period1964-1970 beforereturning to the question of the impact of thewage policy on theBrazilian size income distributionin the sixties.
The Evidence forWages
In addition toreal minimuniwages, sonic studies haveused axerage oage Per worker in the













lying figures, aS abasiS for showtng the mpa(i at the wage policy.' The
nlalor argumentslotthis are that(1)tor the period as a'hu)u, and
particularlY after 1968,real average wages have shown an increasing trend
1lthough the overall rate of increase has been below that 0) productivity
due to the restrainton wageI iiiposed by the wage policy); and (2) ckiring
the period 1964-1968, average wagesreniained constant or decreased.
Since thisperiod the argument goes, coincides with that in which ex-
pected rates of injlationhave been underestimated in the application of the
collective wagereadjustment formula, this slackening in the growth of real
average wagesis also the result of the wage policy.
Table 2 presents indexes ofreal average wages in the nianufacturing
sector in the sixties(1959 = 100), computed on the basis of three cost of
living indexes, thegeneral price index, and the wholesale price index for
industrial products.
Our discussion of this typeof evidence will focus on conceptual
problems associated with the useof average wages and the empirical
difficulties behind the interpretationof the Brazilian data on average wages
in the manufacturing sectorin the sixties.
Average wages have been sowidely used as a measure of wages that
some of theproblems involved in this ad-hoc procedure have been lost
TABLE 2Brazil: Manufacturing Sector, 1 962-i 970,
NOTE:The indexes are computed with the following
alternative deflators: (1) cost ot
living, Rio de Janeiro; (2) Cost of Living, São
Paulo, compuied by DIEESE, alabor
union research institute; (3) Cost of Living,São Paulo; (4) WholesalePrice Index
of Industrial Products; (5) Genera! PriceIndex. Deflators (1),(2),(4), and (5)
obtained from Conjuntura Económica,published monthly by theGetulio Vargas
Foundation, Rio de Janeiro.
SOURCE: Raw data on average wages obtained from surveys
and censuses of manufactures,
published by Fundaç5o Instituto Brasileirode Geografia eEstatistica, Rio de
Janei ro.
Indexes of Real Average Wages perWorker
(1959= 100)
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$ A fifth argiifllent tiirgesdirectly Irom Our Previous dan that thewage
policy does nOtnP(ecsarily ifl1)()SC a constraint on the ril)Prat,oil of market
mechanisms of wagedetermination. An overview of the labor market in the
sixties wi Ibe presented below in order to eluciolate how the forces of
supply arid demandmight have affected wage determination iii the sixties.
Let us now relate someof the points dlScuSSeJ above to the overall
performance of the Brazilian econom' in the period under discussion. The
basic point is thatthis performance, although characterized by an impres-
sive overall rate ofgrowth, was characterized by the occurrence of business
cycles. The years of 1 963-1966 were aperiod of recession or slack growth,
whereas the period from 1967 on was characterized by boomyears.'In
the first period, the economyexperienced sluggish employment and even
unemploynlellt in some sectors.
Note that the period when real average wages were found slackening or
decreasing (1964-1967) roughly coincides with the years of recession or
slow growth, whereas the period of increase in real average wages starts
with the boom years.Itisagainst this background that we can now
piece together the arguments developed above with respect tothe evi-
dence on real average wages: the figures in Table 2 are consistent with
several hypotheses which casts doubt upon their significance as indicators
of wage policy effects alone. The basis for this argument istwofold. On the
one hand, the performanceof real average wages in the period 1964-1966,
although consistent with the hypothesis thatitis a result of the wage
policy, is consistent with the following as well: (1) lower wagesderiving
from market conditions characterized by aslackening demand for labor,
and (2) a probable reduction in the numberof hours worked per man
during that period. On the basis of thethird argument raised above,
average wages should hehigher in recession years since the wagesof the
laid-off workers are below average. The factthat an increase is not found in
1965 could be the result of the counteractingeffects mentioned in (1) and
(2).
On the other hand, the performance of average wagesafter1 967 might
have hidden or lessened the effect of the wage policysince itreflects
higher wage rates deriving from a market which becametighter and less
bound by the wage policy constraints and/or an increasein the number of
hours worked per man, a phenomenon which is likely to occurin boom
years. The following hypotheses are also consistentwith the behavior of
average wages after 1967: (1) if it were not forthe wage policy, theywould
have grown faster; t2) the.y have increased because thegovernment cor-
rected the formula for the underestimation of the expected rateof inflation;
(3) they have not grown faster becaLise expansion in
employment in the
late sixties occurred mostly at the lower level 101)5, thusmoderating the
rising trend in average wages; (4) the fact that they haveincreased reflects
expansion of the industries paying higher wages.
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Let us now so nìina Ii Ze 0111 a rgu tiwnts U p to this( d lIt. The I )ehavk)I
f average wages per worker in the Brazilian manhlta(ttjrjne r
sixties is a phenomenon altec ted by several (actors,onie ot Wlijdi
Were
mentioned above. Until their partial effects are disentangled, ()I1('
Or) thin
ice when trying to infer particular conclusions Ircmi the existing da
Finally,it should he noted that, while we have been talking
about
average wages, following current usage, what we actually have avaj
able
are figures on average earnings. Wells (1974) and Bacha (1975) ha;e
suggested that the wage policy can cause regressive effectswithin the
distribution of earnings as executives and blue-collar workersin high
hierarchical status have improved their positions in the earnings
structure
relative to those in the lower level jobs whose bargaining pOsitionhas l)een
weakened by the ineffectiveness of the labor unions. This showsthat the
figures on average wages, besides being prone to ambiguous
interpreta.
tions, have a limited usefulness in the analysis of the distributive
impact of
the wage policy, since the type of regressiveness pointedout by Hacha and
Wells could have occurred with increasingor decreasing averagewages.
Of course, with the wage policy affectingwages as a whole the probp
would be more serious.
The Impact on Income Distribution
Let us suppose, for the sake of argunient, that additionalresearch would
lead to the unambiguous conclusion that thewage policy has generally
restricted growth in real wages in the manufacturingsector as well as other
covered sectors. Could one infer, then, thatthis could be a factor explain.
irig the worsening of the Braziliansize income distribution in the sixties?
Some of the existing studies havegiven an aluirniativeanswer to this
question on the basis of whatseems to be simple intuition. In actual fact,
however, the link l)ettveen thetwo phenomena is not that simple,as we
now proceed to demonstrate.
First,let us look at theconcept of real wages to be adopted in the
discussion. As Table 2 indicates,the result deoends very muchon the
ifl(lex chosen to deflatenominal wages. ltcan be seen from that table that,
in general, cost of livingindexes lead to lower realwages than general
price indexes or wholesaleprice indexes for the manufacturing sector.
Therefore, to go from thosewho have lost to those whohave gained is not
a simple task. What theseindexes show is thatsome items thai have an
important weight in thecost of living indexes have experienced fasterPrice
increases than those inthe industrial sector andthe genera II)r!ce index ol
the economy Letus consider, for example,two important items in terMS of cost of living changes:food and services,For these groups it WoUld be
necessary to analyze how theprice changes are translated into the personalI
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nçomedistribution Within theagriniltiire and Service sectors. The fact that
some ofthe most important prices in tirmS 01 Cost 01living indexes are
adminiSte
prices received bygovernment enterprises (e.g., in electricity,
fuel, watersuppliesan(l url)an transportation) complicates the problem
evenfurther, since this wouldinvolve the role of the government in setting
the personalincoflie distribution from the point of view of its pricing and
expend1tupolicies a problem not yet investigated in Brazil. It is impor-
tant toeniphasize that the prices in the areaunder direct government
control were heavilysubsidized before 1964 and that their increase since
then has beenwell above the average rates of inflation, thus making the
government sector a gainerin terms of price increases after 1964. Intersec-
toral differences in the rateof price changes thus pose a major drfficulty for
the analysis of therelation between wage policy and personal income
distribution
Leaving aside the problemof deflating wages, let us turn to a particular
case, themanufacturing and mining sectors. We assumethat, due to the
impact of the wage policy, wageshave lagged behind profits within these
sectors. This brings us to asecond point of our discussion. A recent
analysis of the largest 318 corporationsin these sectors has shown that, in
1972, public enterprisesaccounted for 35.4 percent of their total net
worth, multinationals, 35.4 percent,and private Brazilian enterprises 24.2
percent.6 Thus, a major part ofthe sector's profit share would go tothe
government and to foreigners,leaving the impact on personal income
distribution unclear: the income accruing toforeign capital does not enter
into the Brazilian size distributionof income, while the income goingto
the government is distributed throughexpenditure, which brings us again
to the problem of how thisexpenditure affects incomedistribution.
A third point is that, in general, in sectorswhere corporationsprevail
profits are often not distributed to assetholders and therefore do not
necessarily appear in the data fromwhich the size income distributionis
analyzed.
Finally, as in the case of minimum wages, wethink it important tolook
at the position, in the size incomedistribution, of thoseaffected by this
branch of the wage policy. Since the sectorscovered b' the latter are
within the urban formal market and, on average,pay wagesabove the
minimum, the position in question isabove the average ofthat distribu-
tion. Thus, we are talking about groupsof people not atthe bottom of the
income distribution and, furthermore, if theyhave relatively lostposition in
the sixties,itis not clear, for the reasonsexplained above, howthe gains
would appear in the size income distribution.
Secondly, the wagepolicy
may have had an impact on employmentin the covered sectors,aract!ng
people from other sectors where their incomewas lowerdue to unem-
ployment or underemployment. For thesepeople the conceptof loss could
be questioned.I
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11111 THE WAGE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC
SERVANISAN WORKFRS IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND/OR PUBLIC
UTftITIES AND/OR FIRMS SUBSIDIZED KY THE GOVERNMENT
It is in this area that the wage policy
Three main factors are responsible:
by the government, the particular
relationships in this area, and some
policy.
has had the clearest inipact
on wages
the overall economicpolicy foII
forms assumed by theemployment
intricacies of this branchof theWage
Public Servants
The case of public servants must be put in historical
perspective Until the early sixties jobs in public servicewere favorably regarded in thelabor niarket. Salaries paid in these jobswere close to thoseencountered in the
private sector for similar occupations. Moreover,the fringe benefits
were clearly more plentiful in the publicsector: earlier tenure rights,leaves of various sorts, medical assistance, earlierretirenient, better pensionplans, and so forth.
The distribution of employment inthe public sectorwas highly regarded
by politicians as ameans of obtaining political prestige,and, as a result,
government payrolls became increasinglyinflated. The federalgovernment was faced with persistent deficits, financedby money creation,and the Increasing payrolls wereone of the elements contributingto these deficits. It is well known that thegovernments after 1 964 placeda strong emphasis
on the control of inflation andon economic growth. Given itsinipact on inflation (through thegovernment deficit)and on econonhicgrowth (through the restraintimposed on public investment),control of govern.
ment payrolls becamea primary target of thepost-1964 economic policy. As a result, the readjustmentsgranted to publicservants came to lag behind inflation indexes.
This overall view issupported by the data presentedin Table 3. It shows a comparison betweenchanges in the salaries offederal civil Servants and changes in the valueof the minimumwage in Rio de Janeiro. Therewere 18 "references" in theFederal Civil Servants'Salaries Scale (FCSSS) in 1960 and 22 in1964 and 1970Coniparisn has been made intermsot references 5,tO, and 15. Minimumwage figures were obtained for the dates closer to thedates when theFCSSS referenceswere modified. The comparison is made in thelast two columnsof the table and, for the purpose of showing theimpact of thepost1 964 wage policy, two distinct periods are highlighted:1960-1964 and 1964-1970.Itis clear that in the first period thereadjustments of the FCSSSreferences were made ata rate above that ofthe minimumwage; the reverse was thecase in the second period.17TABLE 3Salaries ofFederal Civil Servants versus
Minimum Wages
SOURCES:
FCSSS references obtained from the textof IaW No. 3826 (11/23/1960), t.aw No. 4345
(6126/1964) and Deciee-I-aw No. 1073 (1/9/1970).Minimum wage figures obtained from







Since it is well known thatminimum wages have lagged behind inflation
after 1964, thereis no doubt that the FCSSS referenceshave had their
purchasing power eroded in theperiod. A study by the DIEESE (1975) has
shown that rates of readjustmentof the minimum wages have beenbelow
the collective rates of readjustmentdiscussed in Section II. This implies that
civil servants obtained the worst rateof readjustment of the three branches
of the wage policy discussed in tiis paper.
Thus far this paper has been criticalof the use of average and minimum
wages as a basis for conclusions onthe impact of the wagepolicy. We
now claim that theseFCSSS references do not sufferfrom major ambiguities
in showing that the wage policy hascaused real salary losses tocivil
servants of the federal government.We support this claimwith the follow-
ing arguments, some of which emerge from pointsalready discussed in this
paper.
For the private sector in general, it waspointed out in Section Ilthat
the wage readjustments under the policy are notmandatory at the individ-
ual level. Salaries of civil servants, however, arenot negotiated atthe
individual level, but depend on salary scales.Thus, the read justmentsthey
obtain are more likely to be affected by a wagepolicy oriented to wage
changes for groups of workers.
Under such conditions, the onlypossibility of obtainingreadiustmeflts
beyond those established for the salary scale is bymeans ol promotion.On
the basis of the information we obtained byinterviewing a fewfederal civtl
servants, it seems that promotions did not occurn a scalelarge enough to
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became themselves a target ofexpenditure control, with theresult that
promotions have not been maderegularly. In general, the onlyddtionai
increases beyond those of the readjustments øt the FCSSS are seniorij
allowances, at the rate of 5 percenteach live years.8
Due to the existence of benefits associated with senR)rity and to the
career system, civilservants in Brazil are a group with low rates
o
turnover. We have seen, in the analysisof Section II,that iI1t(rtjrfland
interindustry turnover was one way of escaping the control of the wage
policy. In the case of civil servants this 1)OSSibIlitV WlS not Open.
For allthese reasons, whereas in the private sector the rateof
readjustment established the mini mum rate of readjustment forstable
employees, in the case of civil servants the government's rate became the
rate of readjustment.
The analysis above has been limited to thease of the federal ciiI
servants.It would be interesting to extend itto mit ta rv personnel and
public servants at the state and municipal levels. As to the formergroup
there are indications that they fared somewhat better than the civilser-
vants, but this is not a great accomplishment.'It remains to heseen
whether or not they have translated their new political status into real
income gains. With regard to public servants at the state and municipal
levels, it should be noted that these two levels of government lostmost of
their autonomy after 1964 and have been subject to the guidelinesemerg-
ing from the economic policy of the federal government. On the whole,we
are convinced that public servants in general have been the group most
clearly affected by the wage policy;it takes only casual knowledge to
perceive that jobs in the public service no longer have the attraction of the
pre-1964 era.
Workers in Public Enterprises and/or Public
Utilities and/or Firms Subsidized by theGovernment
In addition to being subjectto the wage policy formula discussed in
Section 2, this group has been affected byparticular aspects of the wage
policy. They were the firstgroup to be covered by that formula, which
started as early as 1964, whereasthe extension of the lorniula to the private
sector in general was accomplished onlyin 1966. This early attention is
explained by the fact that thegovernment deficits are affected h'' the
payrolls of these firms via thegovernment outlays they receive as subsidies.
Therefore the control of thesepayrolls also became a prime target ot the
post-1964 economic policy, giventhe relation of these deficits to the
overall problem of inflation andgrowth.
This group must submitrequests for collective wage readustnients to theiional Co1iilcil onWage Policy (N(V'P). The CoLi ncilal(ilates the
annual rates otreadjListiiit0t by making use @1 the formula and thcn
authorizes thereadjustment. In the case of firms subsidized by the govern-
ment, theconcurring approval ofthe subsidizing agency must l)e obtained
in additionto the aLiIh0ri7atIfrom the NCWP.
After Ihpolicy had been applied in this tashori for some time these
firms realizedthat their wage and salary scales, read justecl strictly on the
basis of thegovernment indexes, were laggingbehind the s\'ages arid
calaries of theprivate sector in general. lii coping with this problem thes'
began to askthe NCWP for wage increases over and abovethe official
rates of readjustrflent especially in the case of certainparticular occupa-
tionS andprofessions. After an analysis l)y thetechnical staff of the NCWP
such requests have oftenbeen approved. In exami ru rig these requests for
vage increasesbeyond the official rates, however, the NCWI acts in a
discriminatorY was', either bythe force of other wage policy regulations or
as a resultof ad-hoc procedures.
Discrimination arising from the wagepolicy regulations arises in the
following fashion. In examining a request,the NCWP follows the rule of
considering whether or not the petitioningfirm has its own resources to
support the additional increase in itspayroll. Ifit does, the extraordinary
readjustment is more easily granted. This hasobviously placed the workers
in the deficit-ridden enterprises,such as the governmentowne(i railways
and shipping lines, in the position of havingtheir wages bound by the
official rates, which are known to have laggedbehind prices during major
time periods.
Discrimination arising from ad-hoc c:riteria can be seenfrom the fact that
these extraordinary readjustnuents have beendisguised in the shape of
promotion plans and 'reclassification schemes"varying from one him to
another. It is also conceivable that the NCWP's decisions areinfluenced by
the prestige of sonic of these firms and the political power ottheir directors
and top executives.
In order to substantiate this part of uLir disc lissiOri one'oi.iIcl have to
obtain data from these firms, and thisis not an easy task.Unofficial
information emerging from various sources indicatesthat workers in rail-
ways and shipping as well as longshoremenhave been treated inthe same
manner as federal civil servants, whereasworkers in public enterprises in
the areas of oil prospecting and refining, mining,telecommunications, and
electricity have fared far better in terms of wagereadjcistments.
Although we have not been able to draw more preciseconcliisioiuS with
regard to this particular area of the'age policy. we areconvinced that
additional research could lead to the identificationof groups whose wage
readjustments have been clearly restricted by the wagepolicy, as veil asof
those who s'ere able to evade these regulations almostentirely.
I
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liv] CONCLUDING REMARKS
On the Concept of Loss Arising from Wage Readjustments
Attempts to illustrate the effects of the wage policy on wages he
Usual compared measures of wages at isolated points in time. Asove shall
this can provide only a partial and maybe not the most importalit
PiCtlireoj
the eventual loss in real wages arising froni collective readjustments
given to compensate for inflation.
Let us make the argument more precise. We assume that (1) the
.nonhina wage rate remains the same between two Consecutive read justme5
and
(2) inflation is continuously changing at the rate of 100 r Percent.
Then th
real wage loss between two readjustments occurring at points0 and
be
Ljnj(n/n,- ) ]dt
where L = real wage loss between t = 0 and= x evaluated in terms of
p which represent the price level of t = 0;= constant nominal wagerate;
and r = continuous rate of inflation.
In a period between two readjustments, the real lossthus depends, ina
simple way, on the length of the time interval betweenreadjijstments on
the rate of inflation, and on the level ofwages at the base period. The loss
will be greater the higher the level ofwages at the base period, the longer
the time interval between readjustments, and thehigher the rate of infla.
tion. Furthermore, over a period ofyears. the loss will also dependon ho
the wages are recomposed by eachreadjustment.
Therefore, if one looks only at the realwage at t = U and the readjusted
wage at= x, two important elements are being neglected: thelengtho
the time interval betweenreadjustnients and the behavior of theinflation
rate within the same period. The implicationis that even increasing reai
wages between periods can hide sizable lossesoccurring within the
periods.
Assume now thatwage and price controls are important for bringing
down the rate of inflation.In criticizing the post-i 964'age polic' one
must recognize the inlplicatft)nsof the fact that the inflationrates in
1960-1964 averaged roughlytwice the average of the 1 965-1 969 period.
In this respect the aboveformula shows that the losscaused by the rate o
inflation became alleviatedin the second period. The fact thatwe are
talking about onlyone element of the formula needsto be underscored. In
1962 and 1963, forinstance, the strongest laborUnions were able to obtain
readjustnients on a six-monthbasis.
Another source of realwage losses could emanate from expectafoN
regarding the futurerate of inflation. If theseexpectations are iniluenced bBrai'1'Wage Pohcy 137
0ernmeflt guidelinesthis could lead workers to settle for lower wages in
riods whenthe actual inflation rate turns Out to be above that indicated
by thegovernment. We thinkthat this line of reasoning could serve as a
basis for amodel showing that the Brazilian economic policy in general
and the wagepolicy in particular may have hurt workers by raising false
exCtat10ns withregard to the future rate of inflation.
On the Relationbetween the Wage Policy and the Size
IncomeDistribution in the Sixties
A few remarks arestill necessary to close our discussion of this problem.
We have shownthat the post-i 964 wage policy has not been neutral in its
distiibutive impact. Ourapproach to this question has been rather different
from the studieswhich have attempted to reach the same conclusion by
simply relating figures on minimumand average wages to the worsening of
the size distribution in the sixties. As wehave seen, the latter approach
leads to unconvincing results. We suggestthat, at the current stage of
knowledge, a more fruitful line of research would be toidentify the groups
that have been unambiguouslyaffected by the wage policy. This we have
done in the case of retired people and pensionersreceiving transfers from
the federal social security system, federalcivil servants, longshoremen, and
workers of the government-owned railways and shippinglines. Obviously,
our analysis could beimproved by additional details; other groupscould
beentified in this fashion or along other lines ofresearch, some of which
have been suggested in this paper. With this approach wewould certainly
obtain a clearer picture of the effects of the wagepolicy on the income of
various groups in society.
As to establishing its relation to the worsening ofthe size distribution in
the sixties, this will require stronger efforts, since theeffects of the wage
policy must be translated in terms of personal incomedistribution as a
whole. The latter has been measured in the aggregate, by meansof indexes
ot income inequality. We have seen that the effectsof the wage policy are
not necessarily translated into the personal incomedistribution and that
those covered by the wage policy are found initsupper half. The
distribution includes groups of people whose income bearslittle,tf any,
relation to the wage policy, such as professionals,self_employed people,
landowners, agricultural workers. and rentiers in general. Italso excludes
the role of the government, which absorbs a major part of theincome flow
generated in the Brazilian economy, and omits the incomethat accrues to
foreign investment.
The image of the wage policy reflected in the mirror ofthe size income
distributionis thus both only partial and blurred. Since,in general, the
distributive impact of the wage policy occurs first in thecontext of the4
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wage-profit dichotomy, we consider theIUfl(ti()flcil income1lis!rit)0i
within the various sectors to be a more adequate mirror. One
ShOuld b
careful, however, not to neglect the role of the governrnenti taking
its share of taxes of various sorts. Nor should the possibility be ignoi
lhJ)
the impact of the wage pa1 icy could also appear wit hi ii the labor
Share In
this respect, the contributions of Bacha (1975) urid Wells (1974)
deserse
special attention.
By proceeding in a piecemeal fashion one could eventually
reach a
clearer view of the impact of the post-1964 wage policy. Inany case,
should be humble about the importance of any one particular
eXplant0
for the worsening of the Brazilian size distribution in thesixties a country following a process of rapid economic developnieiit
Brazil hac
experienced important structural c:ha nges while si mu It aneotisly
suffering
from endemic inflation and occasional business cycles. Among
the severa
factors likely to have influenced the behavior of the sizeincome distrib.
tion in the sixties, we can mention the following,sonic of whichare
interrelated: (1) access to subsidized credit underconditions of inflation
which is one of the key elements in the process of capitalaccuniulat ion in
Brazil;(2) changing regional inequalities-_-interestjriglythe degree of
personal income inequality within the rich andpoor parts of the countr' is
lower than for the country as a whole;h1 (3) the roleof education (this has
been the focus of a 1973 studs' by L.angoni thatbecame a source for
endless controversy);12 (4) the effect of sizableincreases in eniploymentat
the lower levels of the wage scales in the market;(5) different patterns of
sectoral growth, including the foreignsector; (6) capital gains of allsorts
that usually follow rapid structural change(e.g., the rapid increase in the
real price of land in theareas experiencing fast urbanization); (7) the
distribution of wealth in general;(8) the role of occupational mobilityin
a
recent analysis, Costa (1975) has found evidenceof a systematic relation.
ship between the degree of incomeinequality and the corresponding
groups of occupations within each state andfor the country as a whole
and 9) the role of thegovernment via taxation, expenditure, economic
policy in general, andas an entrepreneur.
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&The major b,i'-is
for indexaton vcas, and still is.the value of the ORTN Undexed Treasury
gondsL The valueof the ORTN is linked to a prke index,hut it has also been, from lime
to time,
affected by government e ur II uk,thou gli to a sc IC stu of than min;mum
wages before1975.
7'The workersri public enterpnSeSandlor poblic utilities and/or turns subsidized by the
goserilnient arc affected by particular i ntricac es of the wage policy inaddition to those
that will hediscussed in this section. Their imptit ationswill he dealt wth in the next
section of the paper.
8See FushlOW(1974). p. 267.
9For detailedaccounts, see Carvalho (1973) annDIEESE (1975).
0See MercadO deTraba!hos Distribuiçio e Compesiç )o thiMao-di'-()bet-Sao 1'/Oi!o-
1970 )Rio de janeiro:
MinistérlO do Trabalho cm Previdencia Social, 1971).
iThe eniphasw ondata from the nianulacturing sector isdue to the lack of reliable data
on an annualbasis for other sectors and forthe country as a whole.
2MacedO (1')74b). PP 63-66.
13For a detailed accountof the social set urity taxes and other taxequivalent obligations
established by the government, seeBaiha et at. (1972), chapter 3. On page 108, atable
is presentedshowing that real average wages inthe- manufacturing sei.torri 1969 were
33 5 percent above 1939levels. to the same pen id. the riot average costof labor to the
firms increased 37 6 percent.the difference being explained by the m)iieI of the sot a)
legislation of the sixties.
14.The theoretical aridempirical basis for the argumentpresented in this paragraph is
explained, with additional details,in Macedo1 974a). copter 4.
IS.The index of production in themanufacturing sector shows decreases in1963 and 1965.
See Ariuário Esla(istiCOdo BraiI-1969. Fundacão tnstitutOBrasileiro de Geografia e
Estatistica, Rio ne Jane'ro. p. 175.
16See von Doellinger andCavalcantu (1975), p. 33.
17tt should be noted that thevatuc 3.71 encountered for the companson between
minimum wages in 1970and 1964 can be considered anunderestifl)atiotl of the
increase in minimum wage. Wehave intentionally hiaed the comparisonagainst the
minimum wage by taking the minimum wageestablished in May 1969 and theFCSSS
references of february 1970. The newminimum wage established onMay 1, 1970.
would change the result from 3.71 to4.45.
ISII should he noted that these FCSSSreferences correspond to salariesfor a six-hour (lay
For some groups, the governmentopen(l the possibility of highersalaries by extending
the working (lay to eight boors. Giventhe implicit loss in ssetfaie,higher salaries in this
case are a misleading compensationfor the efteCts ut thi' wagepOli( v. In any case this
again shows that the personal incomedistribution tails to account forsonic ot the
implications of the wage policy.
See, for instance, Rezemide do Sitca11972). P.7')
On the basis of the General Price Indexpuhhshed b( i)ri)tiii!LiI.l D imflomu athese
averages ss ere 31 .3 percent in thelatter period and 56.7percent in the former.
See Costa (1973), P231.
For a partial ,iccount, set' Tolipan andTioi'lIiII 975).
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